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Abstract
The rise of bioinformatics is a direct response to the political difficulties faced by genomics in 
its quest to be a new biomedical innovation, and the value of bioinformatics lies in its role as 
the bridge between the promise of genomics and its realization in the form of health benefits. 
Western scientific elites are able to use their close relationship with the state to control and 
facilitate the emergence of new domains compatible with the existing distribution of epistemic 
power – all within the embrace of public trust. The incorporation of bioinformatics as the saviour 
of genomics had to be integrated with the operation of two key aspects of governance in this field: 
the definition and ownership of the new knowledge. This was achieved mainly by the development 
of common standards and by the promotion of the values of communality, open access and the 
public ownership of data to legitimize and maintain the governance power of publicly funded 
genomic science. Opposition from industry advocating the private ownership of knowledge has 
been largely neutered through the institutions supporting the science-state concordat. However, 
in order for translation into health benefits to occur and public trust to be assured, genomic and 
clinical data have to be integrated and knowledge ownership agreed upon across the separate 
and distinct governance territories of scientist, clinical medicine and society. Tensions abound as 
science seeks ways of maintaining its control of knowledge production through the negotiation of 
new forms of governance with the institutions and values of clinicians and patients.
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Introduction
Innovation in biomedicine is supported by an infrastructure of knowledge governance at 
national and transnational levels (Salter, 2009, 2011; Salter and Salter, 2010; Waldby and 
Salter, 2008). As each new area of biomedicine emerges, it may generate demands for 
change in the existing modes of knowledge governance: demands that reflect not only 
the particular qualities of the innovation but also the political interests of those sponsor-
ing it. These demands may engage smoothly with the dominant systems of governance 
or they may produce tensions when they imply redistributions of political and economic 
power in the production of biomedical knowledge and in the ownership of the benefits 
produced. Either way, the control of the emergence of new knowledge through the main-
tenance and construction of governance determines how the politics of the new domain 
play out. For no field is this more true than for genomic science, with its impressive 
portfolio of biomedical promise, economic potential and political ambition.
With the launch of the Human Genome Project (HGP) in 1990, biology acquired its 
first ‘big science’ project, enabling it to compete effectively with physics and chemistry 
for status, public attention and state resources (see, for example, Cook-Deegan, 1994; 
Watson, 1990). Integral to that competitive drive has been the claim that genomic science 
will ‘provide researchers with powerful tools to understand the genetic factors in human 
disease, paving the way for new strategies for their diagnosis, treatment and prevention’ 
(National Institutes of Health (NIH), 2015). A brave new market of genomic medicine 
appeared to beckon. Early supporters such as President Bill Clinton heralded the project 
as ‘an epoch-making triumph of science and reason’ (The New York Times, 2000). The 
imminent health dividend for state and society seemed an irresistible justification for 
genomic science investment.
The delivery of this dividend has proved elusive, as the banks of bio-data have multi-
plied whilst the route to their translation into medical practice has become ever more 
complex. By the early 2000s, genomic science faced a credibility crisis. It is here that the 
rise of bioinformatics becomes important as a direct response to the political difficulties 
faced by genomics in its quest to be a new form of biomedical innovation. Bioinformatics 
offered the means of retaining the impetus of the science, the trust of state and society 
and the flow of public resources. As Dame Janet Thornton, Director of the European 
Bioinformatics Institute (EBI), emphasized, ‘it will be the biomedical informatics that 
will allow translations from knowledge and research into medical practice, delivered 
through the doctors… in the clinics, in the hospitals and ultimately for the GPs’ (House 
of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2009: 20). The political value of bioinfor-
matics is that it acts as the bridge between the promise of genomics and its realization in 
the form of health benefits. Without bioinformatics and its professed ability to address 
the exponentially rising tide of genomic data, it is doubtful whether the genomics project 
would have maintained its political momentum beyond the late 1990s; current high pro-
file initiatives such as the UK’s Genomics England in 2014 ($524 million) and President 
Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative in 2015 ($215 million) might not have been 
launched (GEN News, 2014; Genomics England, 2015; The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2015). But if bioinformatics was to work as a solution that maintained 
and enhanced the power of genomic science, governance control had to be assured. The 
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epistemic incorporation of bioinformatics as the saviour of genomics had to be integrated 
with the operation of two key aspects of governance in this field: the definition and own-
ership of the new knowledge. Only in this way would genomic science be able to guar-
antee that it reaped the benefits of the very substantial change in the production of 
knowledge on which it was embarked. How was this political ambition achieved?
In this article, we first describe the political problem facing genomics and the position 
of bioinformatics as a possible solution to that problem. To what extent did genomics 
become the victim of its own promissory vision, expanding the expectations of the health 
benefits to come whilst lacking the scientific capacity to deliver, thus generating the 
political need for a fresh form of legitimation of its social value? Second, what shape has 
the construction of the governance of bioinformatics taken, in attempts to reinforce and 
sustain its power, and how has this governance been legitimated? Third, to what extent 
has this exercise in scientific control been challenged, as the production of genomic 
knowledge has been extended beyond the territory of science to the domain of clinical 
medicine? In what ways and with what effect has this transition exposed science’s gov-
ernance control to novel pressures from the values and interests of clinicians and patients?
We gathered data in two phases. In the first, internet desk-based scoping exercises of 
existing policies on bioinformatics were conducted through the analysis of policy docu-
ments of state and non-state governance actors in the UK, China and India, secondary 
‘state of the science’ reports and expert overviews, industry trend reports, and science 
journalism. The results of this phase were summarized in project working papers and 
used as the platform for the development of a semi-structured interview schedule (Datta, 
2014; Zhou, 2014). Thirty-two interviews were conducted with leading bioinformati-
cians, other elite scientists (particularly in the field of genomics) and policy makers 
spread across the three countries. The distribution of the interviews by country and pri-
mary role (scientist or policy maker) is shown in Table 1. Often a scientist would have a 
secondary role and also act in a policy-making capacity through formal membership of a 
state organization and, in some cases, would have strong industry links. The numerical 
effect of this overlap of roles within the interview sample is shown in Table 1. The inter-
views were recorded, transcribed, and analysed employing the conceptual framework 
developed in the following two sections. Initial categories derived from this framework 
Table 1. Number of interviews by country, and number of roles by country.
China India UK Total
Interviews by country
Science 8 8 10 26
Policy 2 1 3 6
Total 10 9 13 32
Roles by country
Science 10 8 10 28
Policy 6 5 7 18
Industry 1 1 4 6
Total 17 14 21 52
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were applied to the interview data and then refined and re-applied in the light of the itera-
tion and ‘fit’ between framework and data. We presented a draft of this paper at a work-
shop of invited bioinformaticians in March 2015, and we revised it in the light of 
comments we received.
A promissory problem and bioinformatics solution
The research funding market of biomedical innovation is characterized by an intense 
competition between scientific disciplines for access to the finite resources of govern-
ment and private agencies. With state and private funding agencies insisting that science 
funding be linked to the productivity of a scientific field and its economic, health and 
social benefits (e.g. Cooksey, 2006), actors have an incentive to promise that their fields 
can deliver such benefits faster and more efficiently than others. An internal power play 
of ‘promissory politics’ is generated, characterized by an inflationary spiral of ‘hype and 
hope’ as scientists outbid each other in attempts to achieve advantage in the research 
funding market (Brown, 2003; Morrison, 2012; Petersen and Krisjansen, 2015). The 
very nature of the spiral, and the inherent risk of loss of credibility in the face of non-
delivery of promised benefits, necessitates the continuing creation of fresh legitimations 
of a discipline’s economic and social value. From the 1980s to the early 2000s, biology 
faced the legitimation problem that the volume, complexity and variety of bio-data pro-
duction outstripped the discipline’s capacity to conceptualize, coordinate, analyse, and 
interpret it (Ouzounis and Valencia, 2003). The fear of being overwhelmed by the amount 
of data generated was palpable and public (Butler, 2001; Reichhardt, 1999), with official 
bodies such as the US National Institutes of Health Research recognising that ‘the com-
puters, algorithms, and software, let alone the support infrastructure, are not keeping up 
with the exponentially rising tide of data in biomedical research’ (Working Group on 
Biomedical Computing, 1999).
The bigger the promise, the higher the expectations and the bigger the risk that the 
anticipated social benefits will not be delivered. In the ‘big science’ of genomics (the 
HGP became known as the ‘Manhattan Project’ of biology) the problem was particularly 
acute and visible (Galison and Hevly, 1992; Lenoir and Hays, 2000). By 1998, the HGP 
had spent nearly $2 billion with relatively little progress other than the sequences for the 
model organisms (Contreras, 2011: 70). And although the human genome was sequenced 
in 2003, the path to the promised health benefits remained obscure. The credibility of the 
science and the belief in its industrial potential were under severe political threat 
(Nightingale and Martin, 2004). In the UK, for example, a series of reports on genomics 
from the UK House of Lords Science and Technology Committee and Department of 
Health in the 2000s reiterated the difficulties faced by genomics and the ‘painfully slow’ 
translation of scientific research into ‘patient benefit’ (Department of Health, 2003; 
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2001, 2009). In the US, the 1998 
White House report Bioinformatics in the 21st century noted that the need for a bioinfor-
matics answer to the translation problem was ‘perhaps most evident in the field of 
genomics, where sequencing data and related datasets are growing at an exponential rate, 
far outstripping efforts to manage and analyze these data’ (The White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, 1998: 6).
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Bioinformatics promised the solution to this problem through the imposition of order 
on the myriad uncertainties of the vast arrays of genomic data and, in so doing, provided 
a fresh legitimation and a new impetus to genomic science. Defined by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) in 2000 as the ‘Research, development, or application of 
computational tools and approaches for expanding the use of biological, medical, 
behavioral or health data, including those to acquire, store, organize, archive, analyze, 
or visualize such data’, the very rapid development of the field has, in the view of NIH, 
subsequently embraced what was then described as ‘computational biology’, which 
included ‘The development and application of data-analytical and theoretical methods, 
mathematical modeling and computational simulation techniques to the study of bio-
logical, behavioral, and social systems’ – adding what is seen to be a much more crea-
tive and dynamic dimension to its promissory curve (National Institutes of Health, 
Bioinformatics Definition Committee, 2000).
Behind the NIH’s confident public definitions of bioinformatics lies a problematic 
political history of epistemic emergence characterized by a continuing struggle between 
mathematics and computing science, on the one side, and biology on the other (Lewis 
and Bartlett, 2013; Ouzounis and Valencia, 2003). Integrating epistemic domains is a 
quintessentially political task because disciplines are constituted not only in terms of 
intellectual constructs and practices but also in terms of institutions with their particular 
interests and ambitions (Gieryn, 1983; Lemaine et al., 1976; Whitley, 1976). When the 
kind of power inherent in the ambition of the genomics project is at stake, the negotia-
tion of a new identity is likely to be long and arduous. Initially, the importation of 
mathematical and computer science knowledge and skills into biology in the 1980s had 
been filtered through the existing power structures of biology, a process that rendered 
bioinformatics acceptable as a service function to the biological paradigm (Leonelli and 
Ankeny, 2012: 29–31; see also Garcia-Sancho, 2012, 2015). There appeared to be a 
natural convergence between the partners, described as a ‘natural marriage’, albeit one 
where one partner was manifestly dominant over the other (Chow-White and Garcia-
Sancho, 2012: 14).
Driven by the imperatives of genomic science, its need to deliver for state and society 
sooner rather than later, and the sheer scale of the genomic data being generated, this 
marital harmony soon evolved into a more abrasive relationship, with mathematics and 
computing becoming ever more assertive. Practices devoted to the extraction of infer-
ences from data in silico have become sufficiently sophisticated that ‘computational 
tools for data analysis are assigned a prominent role in facilitating the extraction of pat-
terns from data, while experimental work is conceived as means to verify and explain 
those patterns’ (Leonelli, 2012a, 50). The consequence is that the creative power in the 
interdisciplinary relationship is moving to mathematics and computer science. As the 
power transfer takes effect, it challenges the ways in which science is organized and 
practiced through the forms of collaboration, division of labour and integrative strategies 
(of models, data, theories, and software) set up to deal with the fact of big data. As a 
result, Leonelli (2012b) claims, ‘Data-intensive methods are changing what counts as 
good science’ (p. 2). Similarly, Stevens (2011) notes how ‘bioinformatics entails a fun-
damental shift in practices of knowledge production: computers have allowed the reor-
ganisation and revaluation of biological work’ to the extent that this generates ‘new ways 
268 Social Studies of Science 47(2)
of being “productive” in biology and that this “productivity” is tied not only to new kinds 
of work, but also to new kinds of knowledge in biology’ (p. 218). Such is the significance 
of the power transfer that the traditional paradigm of hypothesis-driven research is being 
replaced by what has been termed ‘discovery science’, where the database is established 
first and the explanations of the patterns they contain follow later (Chow-White and 
Garcia-Sancho, 2012: 146). In the workplace, the in silico ‘dry labs’ of electronic data-
bases and computation are becoming as important as traditional in vivo ‘wet labs’ as 
the primary location of disciplinary activity (Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council [BBSRC], 2012). In this space, the identity of bioinformatics is being 
forged and its political value established through the confidence it generates in the future 
of biology. It is ‘through computerization – through the principles and practice of bioin-
formatics – that genomics has become “industrialized” and “commercialized”’ and sci-
entifically productive (Stevens, 2011: 240). And through the enhanced credibility this 
delivers, bioinformatics has rendered genomics more productive politically.
The reward for the epistemic solution bioinformatics offered to the impasse faced by 
genomics was visibility and resources. In the UK, in 2009 the Department of Health duly 
recognized that ‘[t]he expansion in EMBL-EBI [European Molecular Biology Laboratory-
European Bioinformatics Institute] data management capacity is vital in underpinning 
the sustainable development of the substantial investments in genetic, genomic and sys-
tems biology made by the Research Councils’ (p. 18). Announcing a £32 million invest-
ment in bioinformatics in February 2014, the UK Minister for Science David Willetts 
emphasized its ‘huge priority for government’ and its ‘potential to drive research and 
development, increase productivity and innovation and ultimately transform lives’ 
(Medical Research Council, 2014). His statement built on the promise of the Strategy for 
UK life sciences to make the UK ‘a world leader in genomics and bioinformatics’ 
(Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012: 41). In the US, Obama’s Precision 
Medicine Initiative promised ‘a bold new research effort to revolutionize how we 
improve health and treat disease’ by engaging ‘a million or more Americans to volunteer 
to contribute their health data to improve health outcomes, fuel the development of new 
treatments, and catalyze a new era of data-based and more precise medical treatment’ 
(The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). Thus was the formal political 
narrative established with bioinformatics at centre stage. How can we best analyse the 
politics that have driven the translation of scientific opportunity into political gain?
Science, ideology and the state
It behoves the scientific community to maintain a close relationship with the state in 
order to be able to guide, if not determine, the agenda of the research funding market 
(Greenberg, 2001).Supporting the core concordat between science and state is an infra-
structure of embedded institutions and values designed to maintain the relationship’s 
authority and legitimacy, promote continuing engagement between the two partners and 
facilitate the addition of new, mutually beneficial, scientific dimensions to the agreement 
(Jasanoff, 2004). Political exchange is continuous, with scientists lending their expertise 
and authority to the activities of the state’s policy advisory system, and the state facili-
tating and legitimizing science’s system of self-regulation and supporting ideology 
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(Jasanoff, 1994). Underpinning the concordat, and an essential component in its operation, 
is public trust that the concordat’s goals, values, rules and outcomes are organized for 
wide benefit.
In his work on the scientific elite of the UK and the US, Mulkay (1976a) emphasizes 
the power of the elite, arguing that it ‘operates as a “buffer group” [between science and 
state], successfully resisting instrumental demands from outside and maintaining consid-
erable freedom for members of the academic research community to pursue their own 
“scientifically defined” interests’ (p. 445). Central to the operation of this power is the 
ideology of science. Developed and refined in the 19th century, this ideology presents the 
pursuit of truth as an ultimate value and the independent scientific community as the 
uniquely qualified occupational group to achieve it (Daniels, 1967). Within the ideology, 
and legitimating the right of science to fulfill this special social role, are an array of oper-
ating principles, propagated by scientists, including rationality, communality, universal-
ism, disinterestedness, impartiality and organized skepticism (Merton, 1973; Mulkay, 
1976b: 637–638). In his work on the development after World War I of the American 
ideology of national science, Tobey (1971) charts the deliberate sponsorship by science 
of ‘an image of the scientist as a particularly virtuous personality’. (pp. 178–179) – and, 
it might be added, therefore trustworthy. Similarly, in the UK, King has shown how in 
the 1930s British scientists promoted an ideology that explicitly linked the values of 
disinterestedness, impartiality, objectivity and so on with the nature of scientific knowl-
edge production (King, 1968). Moral worth, epistemic identity and the right to be trusted 
were presented as indivisible.
The significance of ideologies can be measured by the extent to which they are politi-
cally useful. In the case of science, its ideology enables it to claim that scientists are 
uniquely equipped to understand the contribution of knowledge to the national interest, 
that the pursuit of knowledge should be publicly funded but not publicly governed, and 
that the values of science ensure that scientists will automatically govern themselves 
according to their established normative codes of disinterest and objectivity. In his US 
study, Greenberg (1969) illustrates the practical application of this ideological power to 
the science-state relationship:
But though reins and restrictions existed, and the principle of accountability (loathsome to the 
scientists) was never absent, the essential point was that, in practice, scientists wrote most of 
the rules for the use of federal money; scientists staffed the agencies that dispensed the money, 
and scientists from the university community advised these same staff scientists on the 
distribution of the money. (p. 330)
Equipped with a high-status occupational ideology utilizing what Mulkay (1976b) 
describes as many and varied ‘vocabularies of justification’, Western scientific elites are 
able to use their close relationship with the state to pursue their collective interests, main-
tain their territories and, importantly for this paper, facilitate the emergence of new 
domains compatible with the existing distribution of epistemic power – all within the 
embrace of public trust (p. 653).
However, as yet the same is not true of the scientific elites of emerging economies 
such as China and India. The scientific community in these countries is relatively new 
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and still building its epistemic identity, institutions, status and relationships with the 
state. In China, for example, although a scientific elite is emerging it is inexperienced 
and lacks the characteristics such as self-regulation and promotion by merit normally 
associated with successful scientific communities (Cao and Suttmeier, 2001; Suttmeier 
and Cao, 1999). There is a long way to go before this scientific elite achieves the ideo-
logical self-confidence of its Western colleagues. Lacking the political muscle derived 
from the historic relationships with states enjoyed by Western scientific communities, 
the scientific elites of the emerging economies remain largely supporting players in the 
politics of global science, with their entry to the transnational scientific networks contin-
gent upon their attractiveness as potential partners in collaborative research (Wagner and 
Leydesdorff, 2005; see also Georghiou, 1998; Luukkonen et al., 1992; Miquel and 
Okubo, 1994). In bioinformatics, Chinese and Indian scientists recognize the fact of 
Western dominance and typically see their development in this field as behind the global 
pace, describing themselves as ‘4-5 years behind the West’ [Interview 18, senior bioin-
formatics manager – China] and ‘we’re always laggards’ [Interview 14, bioinformatician 
– India]. A director of a Chinese genomics research centre commented: ‘Bioinformatics 
in China is still at a relatively early stage, with few internationally influential articles, 
databases, algorithms, and software. The collaboration between bioinformatics research 
and experimental biology is not adequate’ [Interview 37].
Ideology, legitimation and the governance of innovation
Western science therefore continues to lead the way in the global development and exploi-
tation of new areas of knowledge, utilizing the science-state concordat to maximize the 
delivery of economic, health and social benefits, on the one hand, and the advancement of 
scientific power on the other. In the case of genomic science, this task has been compli-
cated by the need to combine its management of the changing governance of biomedical 
innovation with the epistemic integration of the new field of bioinformatics into its sphere 
of influence. Central to this process has been the propagation of modes of governance 
designed to ensure that, through bioinformatics, genomic science is able to order the pro-
cess of knowledge production in a manner consistent with its interests.
What was, of its nature, a challenging political task has been intensified by the sheer 
scale, complexity and exponential growth of the databases that form the core resource for 
the genomics project and the platform for the bioinformatics contribution. Important 
milestones in the evolution of a global network of databases can now seen to be the 
Protein databank (now the Worldwide Protein Databank or wwPDB) in the 1970s, the 
EMBL-Bank (DNA – now the European Nucleotide Archive) in 1980, GenBank (now 
part of US’s National Centre for Biotechnology Information [NCBI]) in 1982, and the 
DNA Databank of Japan (DDBJ) in 1986. From these separate initiatives emerged in 
1987 the platform for a global infrastructure of database creation and storage through the 
formation of the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Consortium (INSDC), 
consisting of a partnership of EMBL-EBI, DDBJ and NCBI. The governance demands 
generated by this infrastructure are reflected in the rate of growth of the data it supports. 
Taking INSDC itself, Figure 1 shows the consistent exponential rate of increase of its 
data over time. Very similar rates of increase are evident in the latest database report 
from EBI (Cook et al., 2016: Figure 2).
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More generally, in the last decade the global quantity of stored sequence data has 
doubled approximately every seven months (Figure 2), with the result that biological 
data volumes will soon rival those produced by astronomical observation (Stephens 
et al., 2015; see also Kodama et al., 2012). In parallel, the engagement between the 
databases and their scientific users has also increased exponentially. EMBL’s (2015) 
figures show the one million requests per day in 2009 for EMBL-EBI services rising to 
eleven million in 2014.
The governance of this immense global enterprise had to be constructed from 
scratch. As Harvey and McMeekin (2008) observe, ‘From an institutional point of 
view, there was a void of norms on how the new streams of bio-data could come under 
public control, determining how such data could be produced, accessed, distributed 
and used’ (p. 39). Furthermore, the process of governance construction was as much a 
political as a technical challenge: to enable science simultaneously to keep control of 
the enterprise and exploit the potential of bioinformatics. Existing disciplinary inter-
ests had to be kept onside, and hence ‘[g]overning the HGP entailed not only constitut-
ing control relationships and material means for coordinating research, but also 
aligning the new regime closely enough with extant practices in molecular biology to 
make building this form of biology feasible’ (Hilgartner, 2013: 410). How did genomic 
science construct a system of governance for the definition and ownership of knowl-
edge that maintained, enhanced and legitimated its power?
Defining knowledge
For research funding markets to operate effectively, creating and trading knowledge, gov-
ernance of the definition and ownership of a particular knowledge entity has to be agreed 
upon, disseminated and enforced. In bioinformatics, as in all science, the operation of 
Figure 1. Cumulative base pairs in INSDC over time (Karsch-Mizrachi et al., 2012: Figure 2).
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both public and private economies of knowledge is dependent on an ontological infra-
structure of agreed-upon measures, protocols, classificatory systems and technical bench-
marks shared by laboratories to enable both collaboration and competition (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003). Standards bind communities of practice together across space and across 
public and private sectors. Stable classificatory systems ensure that concepts and defini-
tions are the same in every geographical location and cultural context, allowing the pre-
dictable communication and shared understanding and practice essential for market 
interaction (Timmermans et al., 1998). A leading UK bioinformatics manager summarized 
the governance issue thus:
Because from an industry perspective, the samplings for it just makes much more sense, 
when you’re working on a common standard. If you’re one of the players in the information 
supply chain, if you can provide the information to your customers in a format in a standard 
that they’re expecting, then that’s going to be an easier sell than if they then have to manipulate 
it in some way. But you get what are called these ecosystems of information. So you’ll have 
information that’s going from labs, to being analysed, to influencing something else. You get 
these ecosystems and it makes more sense if everybody is using the same standards. 
[Interview 31]
Another interviewee observed,
I think that definitely [standards creation] is a big rate-limiting step for innovation in this space 
because unless the standards are there, you can’t build the tools, and unless you have the tools 
you really can’t find out exactly what use cases are. So it’s a sort of chicken and egg problem. 
[Interview 9, bioinformatician]
Figure 2. Growth of DNA sequencing (Stephens et al., 2015).
Salter and Salter 273
The key political question is, who controls the creation of standards for the definition of 
the tradable knowledge in the operation of the bioinformatics market?
Reflecting on the role of publicly funded research in bioinformatics, Harvey and 
McMeekin (2008) argue that ‘the control over standards by the scientific community is 
a key feature of public appropriation’ and that ‘new institutions of control developed in 
response to new epistemic forms, the biodatabases’ (p. 66). How does such governance 
creation work where, as was the case in the early days of the new biodatabases, not only 
are the quality norms absent but the traditional paradigm of hypothesis-driven research 
is being replaced by the database-led approach of ‘discovery science’? The head of a UK 
bioinformatics institute provides an insight into the operation of self-regulation by sci-
ence in this situation, describing those involved as constituting a ‘branch of science’ in 
their specialist work on ontologies and standards:
So people realized as soon as the technology to derive this data was there, that there would need 
to be standards and ontologies, and so a group of scientists around the world get together, they 
have a conference and say we need a standard, how are we going to do this? And then certain 
people come together and they form a committee, and they work, usually somebody will lead 
that and propose a standard and then it gets sent out to all of the people around the world, and 
they all comment, and eventually there is a paper that says: ‘This is the agreed standard!’ And 
that standard, in this case, was used to drive [database name], which is the database here, but 
there are various other databases in a consortium. It’s called the IMEX around the world that all 
use the same standards. So then once it’s agreed it becomes de facto, but it usually takes three 
to five years to do that. [Interview 22]
Emphasizing the significance of publicly funded science in this domain, the interviewee 
added: ‘There might be people in companies who get involved in that standards defini-
tion, but so far none of these standards have been driven primarily by companies; it’s 
been an academic exercise’.
If for ‘academic’ we read ‘public academic’ it becomes clear that the global, publicly 
funded bio-database institutions of the West and Japan, the NCBI, the EBI and the DDBJ, 
working through their collaborative platform, the INSDC, are driving what Harvey 
and McMeekin (2009) term the ‘political economy of self-regulation in bioinformatics’ 
through a ‘dominant, hegemonic presence’ (pp. 492, 502). From its inception, the INSDC 
has included governance creation as a key activity, drawing on the expertise of its con-
stituent members to develop ‘core collaborative instruments’ (such as the Feature Table 
Document, the unified accessioning system, and the data model underlying the Sequence 
Read Archive) to organize and facilitate data definition, storage and access (Brunak 
et al., 2002; Karsch-Mizrachi et al., 2012). In parallel, the member organizations them-
selves continue to refine their own governance expertise; for example, the NCBI (2016) 
‘develops and promotes standards for databases, data deposition and exchange, and bio-
logical nomenclature’.
A senior UK bioinformatician manager elaborated on how these global institutions 
build on their critical mass to maintain the momentum through further projects:
So big science projects like the ENCODE project, the 1000 Genomes Project, have really been 
taking bioinformatics forward … To take the 1000 Genomes Project, there was a whole set of 
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new types of file formats that were developed and sorts of algorithms for doing various things 
as a result of the project… So you’ve got the funders, you’ve got the technology, the new types 
of next generating sequencing, the RNAseq as a key example of that, this is generating new 
algorithms, new software methods. [Interview 31, bioinformatician manager]
As fresh state-funded bio-databases have come on stream, they have been linked to the 
governance-development activities of these senior partners through a global network of 
scientific institutions tasked with harmonizing the ontologies of data in diverse data-
bases. Organizations such as the Microarray Gene Expression Data Society, the 
Macromolecular Structure Database (part of the worldwide Protein DataBank), the 
Gene Ontology Consortium project and the Genomics Standards Consortium have 
defined the minimum information standards for any deposition process incorporating 
data into public domain databases. In the words of two of the scientists involved in their 
development, bio-ontologies exercise definitional power through the ‘formal represen-
tations of areas of knowledge in which the essential terms are combined with structur-
ing rules that describe the relationship between the terms. Knowledge that is structured 
in a bio-ontology can then be linked to the molecular databases’ (quoted by Leonelli, 
2012a: 51–52). Emerging in support of this mode of knowledge governance is the cura-
tor, tasked with creating bio-ontologies and adapting existing ones in order to organize 
data into a form capable of meeting the globalized research needs of bioinformaticians 
and biologists alike (Howe et al., 2008). With curators ‘well aware of the epistemic 
power of their classification systems’ (Leonelli and Ankeny, 2012: 32), governance 
control is thus exercised by science through the definition and propagation of shared 
constructs within which various communities in the ‘ecosystem of information supply 
chain’ [Interview 31, bioinformatician manager] agree to operate. In this manner, scien-
tific knowledge production and governance norm production go hand in hand.
This is not to say that private industry does not have a role in the creation of standards 
governance in bioinformatics. It does, but it is obliged to work within the dominant 
agenda established by the public science projects and institutions. In their study of 
expressed sequence tag and single nucleotide polymorphism databases, Harvey and 
McMeekin (2008) note,
By establishing a global community of producers of data, constitutive of public production, the 
institution of an all-inclusive bio-database of a particular category gains a competitive advantage 
over partial databases. The more effective this process of inclusive bio-database growth, the 
less the scope for partial databases traded by commercial enterprises. (pp. 66–67)
From this economic advantage then flows the power to establish the measures of robust-
ness and quality of data that govern the bioinformatics market (p. 67). What remains for 
the private sector is the servicing of the development of standards within the academic 
agenda. Hence an interviewee observed,
So I think that commercial companies do have an impact on standards, and actually not just the 
work that we’ve done, but if you look at the work of the Pistoia Alliance, a lot of that is focused 
on standards, and that’s a life sciences standards organization, which involves lots of commercial 
companies. [Interview 31, bioinformatician manager]
Salter and Salter 275
The hegemonic power of this mode of bio-knowledge standards governance, its abil-
ity to be both inclusive and exclusive in the operation of its rule systems, is apparent 
in the position of emerging economies, where the infrastructures in the life sciences 
are still developing. From a UK perspective, although the bioinformaticians inter-
viewed would have frequent collaborations with scientists in the US, Europe and 
Japan, their collaboration with China and India is described in terms of potential and 
the provision of advice at best, rather than as regular interaction with equal partners. 
In large part, this is the result of the inability of Chinese and Indian scientists to achieve 
the technical standards required for access to international bio-databases. In the spe-
cific case of the databases of model organism biology, there is a much lower chance 
of incorporation of data from less prestigious, non-English speaking laboratories in 
developing countries and less chance of the scientists from such countries participat-
ing in the development of international databases (Leonelli, 2014: 6). As one might 
expect from the customary operation of hegemonies, the net effect of bioinformatics 
standards governance has been to render ‘genomics a selectively global industry, cre-
ating a specific map determined by Western science, technology, and government and 
economic interest’ (Thacker, 2006: 18).
Owning knowledge
The governance of knowledge standards defines the parameters within which bioinfor-
matics affects the process of genomic innovation, and knowledge ownership determines 
who benefits from the implementation of these definitions. The governance of what con-
stitutes tradable knowledge in bioinformatics works happily within the accepted under-
standings, networks and institutions of the state-supported Western science hegemony 
adding fresh dimensions to this infrastructure as and when necessary. However, the gov-
ernance of who owns the knowledge has proved much more contentious. Here in the 
domain of intellectual property, what Chow-White and Garcia-Sancho (2012: 144) term 
‘the politics of the database’ has produced continuing institutional and ideological strug-
gle with, on the one hand, scientists arguing that genomic information should be a public 
good husbanded through the stewardship of science and, on the other, entrepreneurs 
promoting the assumptions of proprietary business models where private ownership is a 
necessary condition of workable markets.
At a meeting in Bermuda in February 1996, attended by the Wellcome Trust, the NIH 
National Centre for Genome Research, the US Department of Energy, the Human 
Genome Project of Japan, the German Human Genome Project, the UK Medical Research 
Council and the European Commission, new rules were set out for the deposition of 
genomic data as a precondition for international collaboration between contributing lab-
oratories to the human genome project (Bentley, 1996). Private industry was not present. 
The agreed policy stated that
all human genomic sequence information, generated by centres funded for large-scale human 
sequencing, should be freely available and in the public domain in order to encourage 
research and development and to maximise its benefit to society. (Human Genome 
Organisation, 1996: 1)
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What was important, the policy made clear, was ‘to prevent such centres establishing a 
privileged position in the exploitation and control of human sequence information’ 
(Human Genome Organisation, 1996: 1) – that is, privately owning and exploiting the 
data. Supported by the powerful alliance of state and scientific actors behind its initia-
tion, the policy was then propelled across the global research funding market and estab-
lished as the dominant form of governance for genomic information, thus reshaping 
scientific practice (Kyrpides, 2009). Kaye sums ups its effect as creating a climate ‘in 
which data sharing has become the default and [grant] applicants must demonstrate why 
their data should be exempt from the requirement that it should be deposited for use by 
other scientists’ (Kaye et al., 2009: 332).
The political ambition of the policy was as much ideological as it was technical, 
designed to establish and maintain the governance power of publicly funded genomic 
science through the exploitation of particular vocabularies of justification in the lexicon 
of scientific values. It builds in particular on the ideological theme of ‘communism’, in 
the sense of common ownership, which Merton (1973) describes as an ‘integral element 
of the scientific ethos’: ‘The substantive findings of science are a product of social col-
laboration and are assigned to the community. They constitute a common heritage in 
which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited’ (p. 273). In his critique, 
Mulkay (1976b) argues that such norms in fact constitute the delineation of part of an 
occupational ideology.
In the case of bio-data, science’s promotion of ‘communality’ as the value that should 
guide the governance of genomics and bioinformatics sought to keep the control of the 
new knowledge within the domain of publicly funded science. This approach immedi-
ately collided with an established and state-sponsored approach to the ownership of 
knowledge. Prior to the adoption of the Bermuda Principles, the data release policies of 
most government-funded projects in the US and UK allowed researchers to retain their 
data privately until publication of results or for some specified ‘exclusivity period’, usu-
ally about one year (Contreras, 2011: 66). Regardless of the preferences of scientists, in 
an early manifestation of the subsequent ‘translation’ debate, governments had begun 
to insist that the requirements of commercialization, including the use of intellectual 
property rights, should form an integral part of university research activity (Powell and 
Owen-Smith, 1998). The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in the US, for example, exercised a pro-
found effect on university researchers by explicitly encouraging them to seek formal 
property rights over their knowledge outputs through patents (Mowery and Ziedonis, 
2002). Meanwhile in the sphere of genomics itself, the controversy over what genomic 
information could, or could not, be patented had been a prominent feature of the govern-
ance debate from the early 1980s onwards (Eisenberg, 2002).
The attempt by genomic science and bioinformatics to reclaim the governance terri-
tory of knowledge ownership and place it securely within their joint domain brought 
science’s view of bio-data as a public good into sharp collision with the industry view 
that private ownership of genomic knowledge was an essential condition of progress in 
the field. Perhaps the most celebrated example of this continuing tension was the techno-
logical ‘arms race’ and political struggle between the HGP and Craig Venter’s Celera 
Genomics to be the first to sequence the human genome (Shreeve, 2004). More prosaic, 
but more important in the long run, was the ability of scientific actors to draw on their 
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access to state governance institutions to shape the governance agenda. In the early 
1990s, the initial patent-friendly attitude of the NIH towards the seeking of patents on 
expressed sequence tags provoked what Cook-Deegan (1994) has described as ‘an 
international firestorm’ of protests from international science (pp. 330–331). Suitably 
impressed, the NIH responded by transiting rapidly to a position where it was able 
actively to support the creation of the anti-patenting Bermuda principles in 1996. This 
shift is reflected in the experience of the National Human Genome Research Institute 
(NHGRI - the principal US funding agency for genome research and part of NIH). 
Contreras (2011) describes how ‘in the negotiations at and leading up to the Bermuda 
meeting, the scientific community’s acknowledgement of the collective norms of data 
sharing and the public domain, bolstered by the gravitas of several Nobel laureates 
and other leading figures, seems to have captured the agency’s imagination’ (p. 88). 
Thereafter, the view that genomic data should be treated as a public good widely avail-
able and unencumbered became ‘ingrained as part of NHGRI’s basic position’, effec-
tively overriding its statutory obligations under the Bayh-Dole Act (Contreras, 2011: 88; 
see also Rai and Eisenberg, 2003). The US science-state concordat had done its work and 
proved its political value to science through the promotion of an ideological position 
supportive of a particular scientific elite. In contrast, the values of commercialization, 
ownership and private profit had suffered a serious rebuff.
The rebuff was strengthened by the ability of the traditional scientific value of com-
munality to ally itself with other ideological themes in the political hinterland of bioin-
formatics. Thus ‘bio-data as a public good’ resonated easily with a powerful cocktail of 
emerging themes in the bioinformatics discourse such as democratizing the data (Chow-
White and Garcia-Sancho, 2012: 148–152), public participation in genetic databases 
(Lassen and Jamison, 2006; Tutton, 2007), open access (Holdsworth, 1999), opposing 
the ‘power geometry’ of the uneven global distribution of knowledge resources (Thacker, 
2006) and hackers as heroes (Marturano, 2003). At the level of international institutions, 
patenting of the human genome faced continuing ideological opposition. In 1997 the 
Universal declaration on the human genome and human rights by the International 
Bioethics Committee (IBC) of UNESCO initiated a global debate about the moral 
statuses of the human body and human life and their relationship to the market; this 
debate has continuing momentum in bioethical and policy-making circles today. At the 
conclusion of its 8th Session in 2001, the IBC adopted by consensus an Advice on the 
patentability of the human genome, which states that ‘there are strong ethical grounds for 
excluding the human genome from patentability’ and further recommends
that the WTO, in its review of the TRIPS Agreement, clarify that, in accordance with the 
provision of Article 27(2) (the morality clause), the human genome is not patentable on the 
basis of the public interest considerations set out therein, in particular, ordre public, morality 
and the protection of human life and health. (IBC, 2002: 1)
Ethical discussions regarding the status of DNA, the human embryo, human dignity and 
the commercialization of the human body, often subsequently enshrined in national leg-
islation and, in the case of the Council of Europe’s Convention on human rights and 
biomedicine, in a protective international agreement now form an internationally salient 
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discourse with which patenting policy and practice in bioinformatics is obliged to engage 
(Salter and Salter, 2013). At the same time, other international developments, in particu-
lar the Convention on biological diversity, have emphasized the importance of the com-
munal ownership of knowledge as a counterbalance to what some have termed the 
‘biopiracy’ of the developing world’s knowledge by Western countries (Robinson, 2010: 
Chapter 2).
Governance compromises regarding the degree and timing of public knowledge own-
ership were nonetheless made as the quantity, geographical spread and complexity of 
bioinformatics infrastructure increased. For example, in its 2008 policy on Data release 
and resource sharing, Genome Canada (2008) ‘recognizes publication as a vehicle for 
data release’ (the right to protect the interest of the individual scientist) and ‘the need to 
protect patentable and other proprietary data’ (p. 1). Similarly, the NHGRI Encyclopedia 
of DNA Elements (ENCODE) project policy offers some protection for the data genera-
tors through the recommendation of a nine month embargo period during which users of 
released data are requested not to publish or present results based on that data (ENCODE, 
2009: 4). There is not ideological harmony within the scientific community, where 
individual self-interest may conflict with the dominant view of ownership. A senior 
GlaxoSmithKline bioinformatics manager involved in joint research with UK university 
scientists into Alzheimer’s, having advocated the view of bio-data as a public good, then 
commented,
We did get quite a bit of pushback from some of our academic institutes; they felt that there 
might be intellectual property there that could be obtained and some of their researchers may 
make that finding and may identify double biomarkers, and identify subgroups of patients with 
Parkinson’s disease, so they were keen to be able to generate intellectual property on that. So 
we ended up sort of compromising. [Interview 32]
Governance control and professional rivalry
Whilst the science-state relationship may be able to resolve such tensions in the govern-
ance of knowledge ownership, other tensions adjacent to that relationship are less ame-
nable to compromise. Commenting on the factors necessary for the successful translation 
of genomic information into patient benefit, the head of a patient organization in the 
genomics field observed,
So you need the biological research, you need the bioinformatics, you need the infrastructure 
and you need the workforce and, fifthly, you need the understanding of patients and public of 
the legitimacy of this approach, so there’s a public communication job here as well. [Interview 
1 – original emphasis]
Awareness is growing of the complexities of governance as a part of scientific work, 
where scientific elites have to negotiate directly with publics in order to achieve the 
legitimacy science needs (Wellcome Trust, 2009). Reflecting on the linking of genomic 
and primary care data in the UK, the head of a bioinformatics department noted,
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And there are many, many regulations that need to be put in place about the ethics, about 
privacy, about how to share this data, about how to store this data, who will store this data … 
what’s the legislation behind it. There is a big gap around all of this, so at the moment there’s a 
lot of science, there is a lot of technology, there is a lot of intelligence, there are many 
methodologies and we are in a very good position, especially in England, to really take 
advantage of all of this soon. But there is a complete lack of legal and regulatory governance, 
political, ethical, social infrastructure to kind of make that happen at the moment. [Interview 
34, head of bioinformatics department]
The difficulty faced by genomics and bioinformatics is that for governance structures to be 
developed, there must be some translation of results into health benefits, resulting in public 
trust; in addition, genomic and clinical data have to be integrated and knowledge owner-
ship agreed upon across the separate and distinct governance territories of scientists, clini-
cians and patients. As the director of a bioinformatics institute noted, ‘Suffice it to say that 
the interface between basic biology knowledge and data, and the clinical world is a difficult 
one to bridge, and that’s where we’re at at the moment’ [Interview 22]. In negotiating this 
complex political route, moving beyond the comfort of its private in silico zone where self-
regulation is the norm and interacting directly with the messy preferences of the wider 
public, science is to an extent constrained by the assumptions of its core ideology.
Reflecting on the scientist-clinician divide in the field of stem cell translational 
research, Cribb et al. (2007) note that ‘the normative structures produced by the institu-
tions and organisations of the scientific and the clinical construct different ethical spaces 
and role positions’ reinforced by the institutional accountabilities to their respective, and 
quite distinct, professional communities (p. 353). Scientists are accountable to the peer 
review mechanisms and hierarchies of science, clinicians to the regulatory bodies of 
medical practice. Their capacity to work harmoniously together, construct new forms of 
governance and negotiate the resolution of differences in their common pursuit of the 
benefits of bio-data integration is therefore limited by their distinct identities, govern-
ance territories and professional responsibilities (Wainwright et al., 2006).
In addition, clinical medicine’s internal culture and epistemic rivalries are at least as 
dense as those of science, generating added complexities in the gestation of new govern-
ance. In his study of the development of standardized guidelines in the French oncology 
sector, Castel has documented how competition between rival groups of physicians 
intent on improving their relative positions or ‘jurisdictions’ at the expense of others 
served to structure the politics of how the guidelines were produced. Standards were 
used as ‘strategic resources’ in the pursuit of political gain (Castel, 2009; see also Abbott, 
1988; Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Similarly, in their work on data monitoring com-
mittees, Keating and Cambrosio (2009) show how the production of governance relied 
on institutions to facilitate ‘the formation of an internal consensus as to how to proceed 
“objectively” rather than on the production of abstract standards, norms and measures 
that express the regulatory ideal of objectivity’ (p. 326).
It is doubtful if all the scientists now engaging with clinicians in the bringing 
together of genomic and patient data are fully aware of the political nuances of govern-
ance creation in a medical domain where power trading is endemic. The head of a UK 
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bioinformatics institute, comparing the openness of data in basic genomics science with 
the restricted accessibility of clinical data in the UK National Health Service (NHS), 
illustrated the nature of the cultural differences, saying,
But in the clinical world this [open access to data] is not true. Clinical data is totally controlled 
by the clinicians, and this is going to change. It will change. They say, ‘Oh, it’s people’s data, 
we can’t let this people’s data out!’ Most people now feel that this is a smokescreen and people 
are just protecting their own thing. These data have been collected by public money and should 
be made available for the public good, I think. [Interview 22]
Such over-optimism, or perhaps professional hubris, is balanced by an awareness among 
other scientists of the need for caution. One observed,
So we need to rethink architectures in terms of how genomic data is stored. I think we should 
go with the assumption that we have to protect it like health information, but for research it’s 
not going to work so how do you de-identify it enough so that research doesn’t suffer? [Interview 
9, bioinformatician]
In the UK, the ramifications of not being cautious and instead happily applying the tradi-
tional scientific view of data ownership to the complex and sensitive world of patient data 
in the NHS are manifest in the furore surrounding the attempted introduction in 2014 of the 
Care.data programme, an initiative to combine the primary care and hospital personal 
medical records of NHS patients within the national Health and Social Care Information 
Centre database. Within weeks of its launch, public and professional concern was so over-
whelming that the implementation of the scheme was delayed for six months and is now 
going through an extensive process of consultation and piloting (Taylor, 2014; Triggle, 
2014). In response to longstanding pressure from the medical research community for the 
better use of patient records as a research resource, in particular that generated by the 
Academy of Medical Sciences’s (2006) report Personal data for public good: Using health 
information in medical research, one of the programme’s main policy objectives was: ‘To 
drive economic growth by making England the default location for world-class health 
services research’ (Carter et al., 2015: 405). As a result of the comprehensive opposition to 
the programme, that objective has now been removed and replaced with ‘To better under-
stand diseases and develop drugs and treatments that can change lives’ (National Health 
Service England, 2015), clearly a less science-oriented and more patient-friendly framing.
There is what may be termed a ‘legitimation gap’ presently evidenced in the difficul-
ties associated with the construction of large scale databases geared to the needs of sci-
ence as well as to the needs of patient care, situated within the cultural territory of the 
clinician (Carter et al., 2015). Researchers have tended to assume that the public benefits 
of science are obvious to the public and that trust will naturally follow. Up to a point, 
such cultural naivety is to be expected, genomics and bioinformatics have little experi-
ence of adjusting their customary approach to the governance of knowledge ownership 
to the highly politicized context of the NHS and the internecine niceties of clinical medi-
cine’s own approach to cultural power. What is then clear is that genomic science has 
much knowledge governance work to do and many negotiations to resolve if societal 
trust is to be retained and science’s control of knowledge production assured.
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Conclusions
In order to improve their fields’ chances of success in the research funding market, 
scientists are accustomed to making promises where the delivery or timescale are 
problematic. Thus a common political problem for scientific domains becomes one of 
maintaining the legitimacy of the field when expectations are not met. In this situation, 
the re-engineering of those expectations becomes an integral part of the generation of 
new knowledge and knowledge governance becomes an essential political tool in ena-
bling such re-engineering to occur. In the case of genomic science in the late 1990s, 
bioinformatics presented itself as the natural solution to the expanding legitimation 
gap between the promised world of genomic medicine and the reality of the exponen-
tial increase in the deluge of bio-data.
However, the recruitment of the new field of bioinformatics as political handmaiden 
to the ambition of genomic science, in concert with the maintenance of control, was not 
straightforward. It was possible that private industry would seize the opportunity and 
reap the benefits of the translation of genomic data into new forms of clinical medicine. 
To deal with this threat and integrate bioinformatics on its preferred terms, genomic sci-
ence established its preferred governance structures for knowledge definition and owner-
ship, which were embedded in its system of self-regulation. The objective was to keep 
control of the genomics enterprise within the publicly funded domain of science. In 
implementing this strategy, genomics had three main advantages. First, its Western sci-
ence base was dominant, secure and unlikely to be challenged by alternative governance 
proposals from the much weaker science-state partnerships of the emerging economies 
with potentially different interests. Second, its transnational networks of scientific insti-
tutions proved themselves adroit from very early on at evolving new forms of knowledge 
governance capable of addressing the definitional and ownership issues associated with 
the new bio-databases in ways protective of the scientific interest. Third, the ideological 
resonance between the bioinformatics trope of ‘bio-data as a public good’, the traditional 
scientific value of communality and a range of anti-private ownership values (e.g. open 
access, democratizing the data, special status of the human genome) proved a powerful 
legitimation tool to set against the ambitions of private industry.
Within the comfort zone of the science-state concordat, genomics and bioinformatics 
have found the construction of the required modes of new knowledge governance rela-
tively straightforward. Where the difficulties have arisen has been in genomics’ engage-
ment with the domain of the clinician in pursuit of the integration of genomic and patient 
data without which the promised world of genomic medicine cannot be created. Practice-
based clinical medicine has its own distinct professional identity, institutions, values and 
interests to protect and, if there are resources available, advance. Unlike genomic sci-
ence, its ideology and practice means that its engagement with society, and society’s 
preferences, is close and routine rather than distant and promissory. Society, meanwhile, 
is drawn into the equation by genomic science’s need for individualized patient data. As 
the political mix becomes more complex so the ability of bioinformatics to maintain the 
genomics momentum whilst keeping control of the field becomes more dependent on the 
construction of new modes of knowledge governance. The global dimension may be 
important here. Although generally accepting of Western leadership in genomic science, 
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countries such as China and India have shown themselves quite prepared to pursue their 
own practice-based approach to biomedical innovation in other fields, such as regenera-
tive medicine, in defiance of the preferences of Western science (Salter et al., 2016). It 
may be that they would sense a similar opportunity in genomics. Thus as the political 
mix becomes more complex and more global, it remains to be seen whether genomic 
science has the ideological muscle, governance expertise and political skill to legitimize 
and implement the next phase in its promissory journey.
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